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Accounting for the fictitious: a Marxist 
contribution to understanding 
accountings roles in the financial crisis 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents a contribution to the debates surrounding the culpability of accounting in the 
recent financial crisis.  It adopts a Marxist theoretical perspective concentrating mainly on Marxs 
work on fictitious capital.  Fictitious capital is any form of investment (for example bonds, stocks, 
derivatives, and collateralized debt obligations) which is based upon the expectation of future 
returns.  According to Marx while fictitious capital is useful to capitalism, it cannot create value  
only human labour can do that.  The recent crisis was exacerbated by the significant amounts of 
investment which were made in extreme forms of fictitious capital.  The paper argues that the 
accounting professions adoption of financial economic rationalities meant that it helped to animate 
the form of financialised neo-liberalism which dominated at the time of the crisis. The accounting 
profession and accounting academia have implemented and propagated technologies and 
rationalities which enabled, legitimised, and drove the activities of business in general and financial 
institutions in particular in the run up to and since the crisis.  While, accounting could be seen as 
being complicit in the crisis, it is important to remember that it was a capitalist crisis.  The intuitional 
structures of accounting mean that it is susceptible of being captured by the most powerful in 
society.  
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The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they 
are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood.  Indeed the world is ruled by 
little else.  Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual 
influences, are usually slaves to some defunct economist.  Madmen in authority, who hear 
voices in the air are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler a few years back. 
Keynes (1936, p 383)  
 
 ..it has long been evident to dispassionate observers that individual capitalists operating in 
their own self-interest are prone to behave in such a way as to collectively drive capitalism 
deeper into crisis.  The same can be said of the various factional interests that periodically 
dominate political and economic power: the bonus-hungry bankers and financiers who now 
set so much of the agenda in Washington and London  Individuals and factions pursuing 
their own particular interests have almost always signally failed to produce a cogent political 
agenda to stabilise, let alone revive, an ailing capitalist system. 
Harvey (2011, p 275/6)   
 
 
In the wake of arguably the worst economic crisis in 80 years, a new debate is gradually opening up 
about the culpability of accounting in the crisis (Hopwood, 2009).  In particular, significant concerns 
have been raised about the roles of fair value accounting, auditing, off-balance-sheet financing and 
accounting regulation  (Arnold, 2009; Gup and Lutton, 2009; Hatherly, 2013; Krumwiede, 2008; Laux 
and Leuz, 2009;  Magnan and Markarian, 2011; Sikka, 2009; Whittle, et al, forthcoming).  At a very 
basic level one might ask how it could be that large financial institutions with recently audited 
financial statements showing positive net assets and no audit qualifications could fail so dramatically 
or require such massive government bail-outs.  Following the bail-outs and failures the press was 
quick to make allusions to Marx but as Kunkel (2011) states; this is a shallow revival of Marxist 
theory perhaps best exemplified by a piece in the UK conservative Spectator Magazine by the 
Archbishop of Canterbury1, Rowan Williams (2008), in which he argued that placing too much trust 
in the market had become a kind of ''idolatry.'' Williams reminded readers of Karl Marx's criticism of 
laissez-faire capitalism, noting, ''He was right about that, if about little else.''   This Marxist revival 
has picked up upon some interesting facets of Marxs work, notably its crisis tendencies but 
Keynesianism appears to set the left-boundary of economic debate in the press (Kunkel, 2011).   
 
This essay argues that a deeper reading of the work of Marx, especially his work on credit and 
fictitious capital, can enable a stronger understanding of the crisis and could play a central role in the 
conceptual discussions about accounting and its role in the crisis.  This paper draws upon David 
Harveys writings (2006, 2010, 2011) and Marxs work on the labour theory of value and the credit 
system including fictitious capital (Marx, nd; 1967; 1973).  The use of Marxist theorisation is not new 
in accounting.  For example, Marxist theory has been used to develop a social history of accounting 
change (eg Armstrong, 1985, 1987; Bryer, 2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006a; Toms, 2005).  Other 
accounting research has used Marxist theory to develop an understanding of contemporary issues in 
accounting.  For example, in the Special Issue on human rights, in Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, several papers draw upon Marxist theory (see for example, Cooper et al, 2011; Sikka 
2011).  Marxist theory has been used to comprehend accountings functions in terms of control over 
the labour process (Arnold, 1998; Cooper and Taylor, 2000; Saravanamuthu and Tinker, 2003; 
Spence, and Carter, 2011) and deal with contemporary issues like accountings functions in 
privatisation (see for example, Arnold and Cooper, 1999; Toms et al, 2011).   In terms of the 
argumentation in this paper, a body of work has been developed which argues that Marx's labour 
theory of value is superior to marginalist economic theory as the foundation for describing and 
explaining the role and practices of financial reporting in capitalism (Bryer, 1994, 1999a, Martin, 
1
 The Archbishop of Canterbury is the senior bishop in the Church of England. 
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1998).  This paper builds upon this body of work by using Marxist theory as a counterweight to 
financial economic theory which, as will be argued in more detail in the paper, provided the 
ideological and theoretical underpinning of the structures and activities which enabled impelled and 
legitimated the events which led to the financial crisis.   Financial economics ideas (positive 
accounting theory, efficient markets hypothesis, agency theory and so on) dominate the field of 
academic accounting as well as the field of accounting practice.   
 
The crisis demonstrated that financial economic theory serves the interests of some more than 
others, for while a few individuals were enriched before and by the crisis, it has had a profoundly 
destructive impact on the majority2.  Although financial economic theory has been empirically 
falsified3 and continues to wreak havoc and destruction it is very difficult to overcome.   For this 
reason several theorists have described financial economics as zombie economics (see for example, 
Fine, 2008; Martin, 2002; Quiggin, 2012).  This is not simply a question of theoretical niceties; in 
practice, in 2014, financial institutions and government policies (whose activities are underpinned by 
financial economics rationalities) continue to impoverish the lives of the majority of people.   
 
Two aspects of Marxist theory are particularly pertinent for the arguments in this essay -- the labour 
theory of value and fictitious capital.  In Marxism only human labour (work) can create value4.  
Fictitious capital is any form of investment (for example bonds, stocks, derivatives, and collateralized 
debt obligations) which is based upon the expectation of future returns.  Since the expected returns 
might be produced in the future, they do not currently exist, and, so are fictitious.  Marx explains 
that fictitious capital (especially stocks and credit) serves several important functions under 
capitalism, not least in terms of enabling capitalist expansion.  But, if investment flows to forms of 
fictitious capital which are not based upon the creation of value, this will, sooner or later, provoke an 
economic crisis.  The flow of money into forms of fictitious capital which are purely speculative and 
not part of the value creation process (although incredibly profitable for some) exacerbated the 
recent crisis (see Chabrak, 2014).   
 
The paper is structured as follows.  After a deeper consideration of fictitious capital, the paper 
outlines the form of economic theory, described in the paper as financial economics, which has 
underpinned neo-liberalism and prioritised the expansion of the markets for fictitious capitals.  Next, 
the paper turns to the impact of financial economics on both professional and academic 
accountants.  Although academic accounting and finance departments provided an incubator for the 
development of financial economics, the ideology of financial economics is founded upon a belief in 
unfettered markets and so is against accounting regulation and so presented a challenge to the 
profession.  This is followed by a brief explanation of the growth of financialisation and the scale of 
the growth and size of the derivatives market.  Alongside the growth of derivatives, financialisation 
penetrated into the everyday lives of individuals and created an economic slowdown.  The paper 
then turns to an explanation of the recent crisis which is described as a mixture of over-
accumulation and over-financialisation, or, in other words, too much money searching for profitable 
investment opportunities and finding the highest returns in speculative fictitious capital aligned to 
falling wages and the destruction of real capital.  Finally, the paper turns to accounting standard 
setters, the accounting profession and the context within which they operate.  It is argued that 
accounting standard setters and accountants are blinkered by their adoption of and dogged 
adherence to financial economics as their conceptual frame.  Accounting standard setters are 
2
 See for example, http://wearethe99percent.tumblr.com which sets out personal narratives of ordinary Americans who have played by 
the rules, worked and studied hard, bought homes for their families, and now feel abandoned and betrayed by the system in which they 
supported. 
3
 This appears to be the case for the majority of activities which are informed by financial economic thought.  Quiggin (2012) argues that 
the US and UK governments are making policy decisions on the basis that the fiscal multiplier is substantial and negative so cutting 
expenditure will increase output.  This claim has no theoretical basis and flawed empirical support. 
4
 This is not to argue that technology is unimportant.  Technology is also created by human labour and can be described as dead labour.  
Even the most sophisticated machinery has to be operated by humans. 
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increasingly international and privately funded.  Although their rules are sanctioned by nation states, 
in practice, it would be exceptionally difficult for these states to reject their accounting standards.  
Finally the paper turns to a discussion of the implications of Marxist theory for accounting, alongside 
accounting developments since the crisis. 
Marx and fictitious capital 
Two facets of Marxs oeuvre underpin fictitious capital5.  These are the labour theory of value and 
the understanding of money as a store of the value created by human labour.  According to Marx, 
the new value created by human labour during the working day is split into two  the part paid to 
labour (their wage earned during the part of the working day described by Marx as necessary labour 
time) and the part appropriated by their employer (which is produced during the part of the working 
day which Marx described as surplus labour time).  The important element of Marxist theory for 
those unfamiliar to it is that new value can only be produced by labour.  Fictitious capital is based on 
an expectation about the creation of surplus value (by the workforce) in the future.  So for example, 
if an investor acquires a bond in Company A, the price of the bond is based upon an expectation of 
payments (interest and repayment) which will be met out of future surplus value.  Therefore, there 
is always a speculative element to fictitious capital since, at best, it is based upon the (uncertain) 
production of surplus value in the future.   
 
There is a qualitative and a quantitative aspect to investment in fictitious capital.  Marx wrote that 
interest is illusionary because it appears to come from money-capital itself without any relation to 
production at all (Marx, 1973).   It is normal that investors buy bonds and are rewarded (in most 
cases) with interest. As capitalism developed, people came to believe that money should grow 
over time.  Marx described this as a form of fetishism.  So, believing that money grows over time, 
investors will invest in the financial institutions and products which promise the greatest returns.   
But, if money that is created through the finance industry is unsupported by surplus value 
creation, the currency may be debased, chronic inflation could occur, monetary crises could be 
created and so on.  A financial system which is purely speculative (and not based upon surplus value 
creation) will undermine the utility of money as a measure and store of value.  Yet, investors are, in 
the main, indifferent to, or ignorant of, the ultimate source of the returns on their investments.   
This means that money can flow to investments in fictitious capital which is not underpinned by the 
creation of surplus value thereby creating a financial crisis.  Aside from being illusionary, interest 
has a quantitative element.  It must be paid.  Moseley (2011) explains that interest is an element of 
the distribution of surplus-value which depends upon an agreement between, for example, the 
banker and the industrial capitalist6.   So, interest payments reduce the amount of profit which can 
be kept by the owners of a business.  This means that, for example, in the case of a banker loaning 
money to an industrial capitalist, one can only gain at the expense of the other.7 
 
Although fictitious capital presents certain vulnerabilities (in terms of its potential to create financial 
instability), Marx wrote that the credit system and its outgrowth, fictitious capital, are essential to 
the expansion of capitalism and can even out many of the frictions of capitalism (Harvey, 2006, p 
239, p 284; see also Kunkel, 2011).  Thus for example, Harvey (2006) explains that shares are forms 
of fictitious capital that played an essential role in the early growth of capitalism, which in order to 
rapidly expand, had to be liberated from the constraints of the family firm  shareholder owned 
companies enabled substantial investments in technology, the reaping of economies of scale and so 
on.  The money received from initial share issues could have been used to acquire real capital8 
5
 The term did not originate with Marx.  Adam Smith had previously used the concept in the Wealth of Nations.   
6
 In Vol III of Capital, Marx places interest alongside other individual parts of surplus value for example rent. 
7
 As will be argued later in the paper, this natural antagonism between finance and industrial capital is an important factor in the 
development of financialisation. 
8
 Real capital is money which is invested in the means of production. 
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 The stocks of railways, mines, navigation companies, and the like, represent actual 
capital, namely, the capital invested and functioning in such enterprises, or the 
amount of money advanced by the stockholders for the purpose of being used as 
capital in such enterprises. . But this capital does not exist twice, once as the 
capital-value of titles of ownership (stocks) on the one hand and on the other hand 
as the actual capital invested, or to be invested, in those enterprises. It exists only in 
the latter form, and a share of stock is merely a title of ownership to a 
corresponding portion of the surplus-value to be realised by it. A may sell this title to 
B, and B may sell it to C. These transactions do not alter anything in the nature of 
the problem. A or B then has his title in the form of capital, but C has transformed 
his capital into a mere title of ownership to the anticipated surplus-value from the 
stock capital. (Marx, nd, pp 319 - 320).   
 
Therefore when C acquires shares, they are bought with the expectation of future returns (based 
upon future surplus value), or as finance theory would suggest, based on predictions of the future 
cash flows and profitability of the business.  The acquisition of shares by C provides no new 
investment in the company.  Shares can be bought and sold many times over as if they were wealth 
itself, although in fact, their market prices represent expected future returns. 
 
Harvey (2006) argues that the credit system and fictitious capital were unique to the capitalist mode 
of production.  However, although fictitious capital is essential to capitalism (for its expansion and 
overcoming timing differences) (Harvey, 2010) it cannot create value: There is no substitute for the 
actual transformation of nature through the concrete production of use values Kunkel (2011).    
Importantly, there are some forms of fictitious capital that are more removed from the value 
creation process than others.  As explained later, some forms of fictitious capital are little more than 
investment-gambles, which if dont come off, are like any losing book-maker gambling-slips, 
worthless pieces of paper.  The recent financial crisis came about in part because of a massive 
expansion in gambling (trading) in these slips of paper.  This raises the question as to what 
institutional structures and ideologies facilitated gambling (trading) and what are the drivers behind 
it. 
 
Thus far, an explanation of Marxs understanding of fictitious capital has been presented in order to 
provide an alternative perspective on the current economic crisis.  In short, money cannot grow in 
value on its own.  Investment takes place within social, economic and political institutional 
structures.  The legitimating structures which enable an understanding of what is allowable and 
what is not allowable in society are significant (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Hines, 1988a).   
 
Berger and Luckmanns four levels of legitimation present a robust and coherent framework for 
understanding the function of linguistic and social structures.  Their first level of legitimation is 
linguistic.  Our language (broadly construed) allows us to name and hence to "know" certain things 
and by having a word for something we must grant its claim to exist. The second level is "theoretical 
propositions in rudimentary form".  This level includes myths, stories and other forms of anecdotal 
evidence which are used to justify certain social events or relations.  The third level consists of 
explicit theories linked to particular organisational contexts.  This would include financial economic 
theory.  Finally, the highest level of legitimation is what Berger and Luckmann describe as symbolic 
universes.  These are able to tie together different institutional environments to explain their 
interrelation9.  It is possible to describe the current symbolic universe as neo-liberal.   
9
 So for example, the English language has the word market.  This gives tangibility to what in certain situations could be fairly intangible.  
At the second level there are myths surrounding the market.  So, for example, it is deemed to have a superior governance function (see 
Chabrak, 2014) and an invisible hand.  At the third level, these myths have been given legitimacy through mainstream economic theories 
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 While there is not an explicit or coherent theory of neo-liberalism, it is a widely used and accepted 
term with common referents (Clegg et al, 2011).  Importantly for the arguments in this paper, a 
particular economic theory has come to form part of the knowledge-base for contemporary 
economic, political and social practices (level 3 legitimation).   Several economists and writers have 
called this theoretical economic form zombieeconomics, while others (for example, Power, 2010) 
call it financial economics and others mainstream economics; yet as will be set out in the next 
section, the term zombieeconomics has some explanatory power.  For ease of exposition, in this 
essay, the dominant form of economic theory under neo-liberalism will be called financial 
economics. 
Zombieconomics, neo-liberalism and social legitimation. 
Fine (2008) sets out a clear summary of the most important facets of neoliberalism and its zombie-
like qualities as follows-    
 
There are two reasons why the mainstream economics in the current phase of neo-
liberalism is zombie-like. First, it is both dead and alive at the same time, undead as popular 
culture would have it. That it prevails within its own disciplinary boundaries with little or no 
contest and with scant respect for alternatives is more or less uncontroversial. No one can 
doubt that there are zombieconomists out there and that they are extraordinarily powerful 
and almost impossible to slay. They are totally insensitive to the considerations of the living 
but merely respond to an inner inescapable logic and, occasionally, perpetrate mysterious 
jerking movements of their own. (Fine, 2008, p1) 
 
Tracing the evolution of contemporary economics from the marginalist revolution of the 1870s 
through the Keynesian revolution and the monetarist counterrevolution to the current phase of 
(financial) economics in which much economic analysis and analysis from other disciplines (which 
have been touched by financial economics to become like it) Fine (2008) notes that economics has 
become largely reduced to the optimising behaviour of individuals in face of market imperfections. 
He goes on to argue that it is the reduction of a very complex world to individuals and markets 
that endows zombieconomics with so much life but with so little content both in terms of analytical 
elements and as a tool for understanding the broader social aspects of contemporary capitalism.  
Fine (2008) argues that zombieconomics is dead in that it is based upon an unquestioned 
methodological individualism and a narrow technical apparatus.  It appears to be totally ignorant of 
its own history and methodology.  It fails to engage with alternatives except to dismiss them as 
unscientific and lacking in rigour (Fine, 2008); even though its own intellectual fragilities are striking 
(Fine, 2007b).   As shall be described later, in the realm of academia, mainstream accounting and 
finance share the same failure to engage, dismiss alternatives as unscientific and suffer from serious 
theoretical fragilities.  In the realm of policy, due to its very narrow focus, financial economics seeks 
interventions to correct market imperfections on a piecemeal basis.  In the realm of practice, it has 
been argued that, UK Hedge Funds and Private Equity firms are like zombies which extract value 
from companies, and also destroy them (Shaxson, 2013).    
 
While Fine (2008) charts the evolution of contemporary economics from the nineteenth century, he 
and other contemporary theorists (Foucault, 2000) have credited Hayeks (1943), Road to 
Serfdom, as one of the major theoretical works, which sets out the economic rationalities (financial 
economics) for neo-liberalism.  Hayeks ideas did not become dominant at the time in which he was 
writing, they re-emerged with the collapse of the post-war boom in the 1970s, the crisis of 
which are used in institutions.  Finally, market theories are used in several institutional settings.  So market prices are used by the state 
as true values, by accounting standard setters as the best source of information and so on. 
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Keynesianism, and the resurgence of monetarism. MacKenzie (2006) explains how financial 
markets grew in prestige with the failure of Keynesianism.  Fine (2008) notes that, unburdened by 
any memory of the extraordinary qualifications that had been necessary to allow them in the first 
place Hayeks marginalist/individualist principles remained sacrosanct to those in the Chicago school 
who built upon Hayeks oeuvre.  The Chicago School reduced the idea of expectations to the domain 
of knowable outcomes with attached probabilities (Friedman, 1953). And the theory of rational 
expectations portrayed individuals as able to optimise by modelling the economy.  Fine (2008, p 
12) states that, it is truly remarkable that it should be felt possible to understand the economy in 
terms of single representative individuals for households and firms.  Financial economics has 
nullified macroeconomics (Lucas, 1987, p. 108; Davis, 2003, p. 35).    
 
Aside from its faith in markets, individuals, and extreme forms of quantification, financial economics 
(as did Hayek) holds sacrosanct the liberal beliefs from an earlier epoch regarding the state -- there 
is always too much government.  Under neo-liberalism, this small government doxa remains 
firmly in place but the state itself is dominated by financial economic rationalities (Quiggin, 2012) 
based on the assertion that markets are superior to governments10. A variant of the belief in small 
government is that while there may be small market imperfections that these are best left alone, 
since, due to the systematic distortion of the policy process by interest groups, the costs of 
government intervention are greater than the costs of the market imperfections that government 
policies are supposed to remedy11. 
 
While financial (or zombie) economics can be seen as one of the major ideological underpinnings of 
the contemporary neo-liberal symbolic universe, it would be a mistake to see the neo-liberal project 
as internally coherent.  It is an, at times contradictory, work in progress with glaring paradoxes.   In 
seeking to better understand some of neo-liberalisms contradictions; it is helpful to distinguish 
between its ideology (rhetoric), scholarship and its policy in practice.  As Fine12 (2009), argues, each 
of these is shifting in content and emphasis across time and place.  Whilst the ideology, scholarship 
and practice of neo-liberalism have connections with one another, these too are shifting and by no 
means mutually consistent13.   
 
In summary, the theoretical basis of the neo-liberal symbolic universe for the past thirty years has 
been an extreme variant of economics which suffers from many flaws.   Its rationalities took time to 
take hold.  To constitute a symbolic universe, neo-liberalism needed to articulate with the key 
institutions of capitalism.  One way in which this articulation occurred is through the models of  
financial economics developed in accounting and finance departments in universities (level 3 
legitimation).  MacKenzie (2006) writes that when the models of financial economics are 
incorporated into societys algorithms, procedures, routines and material devices, financial 
economics will have become performative. In the case of financial models, they will be 
performative even if those who use them are sceptical of their virtues, unaware of their details, or 
even ignorant of their very existence.  Accounting and finance provide a conduit through which 
financial economic rationalities are legitimated, implemented and become part of the symbolic 
universe.  The next section considers how financial economic ideas became the dominant 
conceptual foundation for both accounting and finance academics as well as for professional 
accountants.   
10
 Quiggin (2012) argues that this assertion has been empirically tested and proven to be false. 
11
 As will be set out in the next section, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) follow this line of argument. 
12
 See also http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/5443/1/coimbra.pdf7 
13
 For example, neo-liberalism takes the ideological position of the glorification of the market and the demeaning of the state while in 
practice calling upon the state to rescue markets and provide an orderly environment in which markets can operate.    
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The new financial economic accountants. 
 
Academia plays a significant role in spreading and legitimating ideas.  For this reason we turn first to 
the impact of financial (zombie) economics on academics.  Interestingly, academic accounting and 
finance departments and business schools provided the incubators for the development of financial 
economic thought throughout the 1960s, 70s and 80s (MacKenzie, 2006).  If the purveyors of 
financial economics wanted their theories to shape social practice, then, their early incubation in 
accounting and finance departments which have close association to practice, with hindsight, 
appears to have been an astute strategy.   In any case, during the 1960s and 1970s, financial 
economics was viewed with distain in many departments of economics, although by the 1990s, 
financial economics had moved from the margins to the mainstream of economics (MacKenzie, 
2006).     
 
Financial economics in the academic departments of accounting and finance  
Chabrak (2012) sets out in great detail the key figures and think tanks who worked hard over a long 
period of time to develop and disseminate their project.  Early key figures that came to influence 
accounting thought and practice included Friedrich von Hayek, Henry Simons, Aaron Director and 
Milton Friedman14.  Their project could have been considered to have its very early roots in 1937 
when von Hayek met Director at the London School of Economics.  These economists created 
institutions to develop and disseminate their ideas.  Two key institutions were the Free Market 
Study and the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) which was founded by Hayek in 1947.  Chabrak (2012, p 
461) writes that the MPS is distinctive because it was a secretive group, met annually/biannually, 
issued no findings or recommendations, and rejected taking part in any direct political action.  
They elaborated a blueprint to rejuvenate liberal doctrine and to subtly and unobtrusively guide 
university curricula, media and political debate.  The members of MPS were astute enough to 
understand that their project would take time to come to fruition15.  Sister organisations to the MPS 
were set up around the world16.  And academic institutions (notably, the universities of Chicago and 
Rochester) began to disseminate the neo-liberal ideas of the MPS.  In this way, the neo-liberal 
project was buttressed and legitimated by influential universities. Forty chairs were created between 
1974 and 1978 to promote neo-liberal pro-market values (Beder, 1998).  Eight MPS members have 
been awarded the Nobel Prize for economics17.   
 
Hayeks (1945, 1948) proposal that price mechanisms communicate information came to underpin 
the financial economics (Chicago and Rochester) school of accounting research.  This influence can 
be discerned in Watts and Zimmermans (1978, 1979, 1986) generation of Positive Accounting 
Theory (PAT) and Jensen and Mecklings (1976) development of Agency Theory (Williams, 2004; 
Ravenscroft and Williams, 2009).  Financial economics research in accounting gained credibility and 
recognition through two dominant academic journals -- Watts and Zimmermans Journal of 
Accounting and Economics founded in 1979 and Jensen and Mecklings Journal of Financial 
Economics founded in 1976. Chabrak (2012, p 474) argues that the success of PAT is attributed to 
its capacity to police accounting knowledge to maintain its elite reproductive order within the 
academic world18.  PAT was significantly bolstered by its ability to support the neo-liberal economic 
project alongside its ideological opposition to Keynesian (the New Deal and so on), market 
regulation and socialism (especially planned economies).  Williams, (2004) and Ravenscroft and 
14
 Chabrak (2012) notes that Director and Friedman were related by marriage 
15
 This was not true of one of the sponsors.  Chabrak (2012, p 462) notes that, supporting a 20-year battle of ideas was much too long for 
its founders. Volker stopped funding the MPS in 1957.   
16
 Chabrak (2012) notes that there are over 100 libertarian institutes in more than 70 countries (Blundell, J. (1999), Hayek, Fisher and The 
Road to Serfdom, available at: www.iea.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/files/upldbook43pdf.pdf) 
17
 Friedrich von Hayek (1974), Milton Friedman (1976), George Stigler (1982), James M. Buchanan (1986), Maurice Allais (1988), Ronald 
Coase (1991), Gary S. Becker (1992) and Vernon Smith (2002). 
18
 This is achieved through these two journals and the American Accounting Association and its Accounting Review.   
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Williams, (2009) point out that concepts such as morality, accountability, factuality, and wisdom in 
practice have been eradicated from the financial economics based accounting research agenda.    
 
The economic context of the development of financial economic thought in accounting is important 
because it demonstrates that accounting technologies are adopted when it is in the interests of the 
most powerful to do so.  For example, Jensen and Mecklings work was developed during the 1973 
oil crisis19 -- a period in which large US corporations were facing considerable competition from 
Japanese companies.   Their work was appealing in that it presented a theory which they said would 
render managers more efficient and which would make them act in accordance with the interests 
of shareholders.  In Jensen and Mecklings work, following Hayek (1945, 1948), and consistent with 
financial economic theory, organisations were portrayed as a nexus of contracts between self-
interested individuals who contract for property rights to maximise their utility.   In such a world, 
accounting has a contracting role to reduce agency costs in bond covenants and management 
compensation plans20.   The policy implication of Jensen and Mecklings work was that in order to 
maximize wealth, firms should take on the characteristics of an efficient market.  
 
While Jensen and Meckling were proposing that accounting could be a useful management 
control/contracting tool, PAT accounting professors, with their financial economic doxa, which 
values unfettered and unregulated markets, were (and are) ambivalent towards the accounting 
profession and its accounting regulatory regime.  For example, although Watts and Zimmerman have 
become the poster boys for a particular kind of accounting research, they are opposed in many ways 
to accounting standards and accounting regulation.  Watts and Zimmermans (1979) work makes a 
strong argument (again akin to Hayeks) against state intervention arguing that audited corporate 
financial statements were produced voluntarily prior to government mandate because corporate 
managers have incentives to contract to supply audited financial statements (Watts, 1977)21.    
 
The anti-regulatory stance of Watts and Zimmerman is reinforced by their contention that self-
regulating markets will not work if disturbed by standard-setting  especially standard setting which 
has been subject to political battles.  Watts and Zimmerman state (1979, p 280) that they assume 
that private citizens, bureaucrats, and politicians have incentives to employ the powers of the state 
to make themselves better off and to coalesce for that purpose. One way by which coalitions of 
individuals are made better off is by legislation that redistributes (i.e., confiscates) wealth.  By 
singling out private citizens, bureaucrats, and politicians Watts and Zimmerman (1979) fail to 
acknowledge that large corporations, banks, accounting firms and so on also through their trade 
associations (and other organisations) resolutely set out to influence government policy (and are 
much more adept at doing so due to their financial power, family connections and so on).  And 
Watts and Zimmermans use of the term confiscates symbolizes their belief that wealth is created 
by capital is therefore diametrically opposed to Marxs labour theory of value.  Making an argument 
which is strikingly analogous to Hayeks, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that the Wall Street 
Crash provided politicians with an excuse to transfer resources to themselves by introducing 
accounting standards (GAAP), SEC rules, banking regulations and anti-trust policies to give the 
politicians control over resources.  In effect Watts and Zimmerman argued that it is in the interests 
of politicians to manipulate accounting rules to ensure that they can take money from companies to 
use for their own purposes.  Worse for the accounting profession, Watts and Zimmerman argued 
that politicians allow auditing firms to transfer wealth from their clients in the form of audit fees.   
19
 The 1973 "oil price shock", along with the 19731974 stock market crash, have been regarded as the first event since the Great 
Depression to have a persistent economic effect -- Perron, P.; University, Princeton; Program, Econometric Research (1988) (PDF). The 
Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock and the Unit Root Hypothesis. Econometric Research Program, Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey. 
http://www.princeton.edu/~erp/ERParchives/archivepdfs/M338.pdf. Retrieved February 3, 2012 
20
 Chabrak (2012) notes that this organisational theory is appealing because it is embedded in a particular belief about human nature (set 
out in agency theory) and within the ideology of capitalist private property.   
21
 Watts and Zimmerman argue that an unregulated market serves as the most efficient controller of management because if managers do 
not maximise the value of company shares then individuals can sanction them by selling their shares.   
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Furthermore, Watts and Zimmerman contend that standardisation restricts the set of available 
accounting procedures and so forces firms to adopt more costly contracting technology.  Watts and 
Zimmerman believe that the form which accounting information takes should, dependent on the 
individual firm, be selected in order to fulfil an efficient contracting role.   
 
The anti-regulatory stance of financial economics inspired accounting researchers has meant that 
much accounting research has concentrated on testing the information content of accounting 
numbers (in terms of bringing about a market reaction/change in share prices) especially after the 
introduction of new accounting standards22.  This type of research was facilitated by 
contemporaneous improvements in computer technology.  Very large databases have been used in 
this research, which confusing method with methodology, has been published with a scientific guise 
(Christenson, 1983).    The narrow market information/investor concern of this research means that 
it fails to consider the macroeconomic consequences of accounting.  For example, Arnold (2009) 
notes that there were a number of financial research papers on Fair Value accounting published 
before the financial crisis.  These papers were concerned with the informational content of accounts 
which used fair value for capital markets rather than evaluating Fair Values macroeconomic 
consequences.  Arnold further notes that financial accounting research agendas are limited and 
ultimately shaped by the availability of quantitative databases.   There is no publicly available 
empirical data on off-balance sheet entities, hedge fund activities, credit default swaps and other 
privately traded derivatives.  Due to its micro economic focus aligned with the problems of collecting 
data, too much accounting research appears to be oblivious to the most socially important aspects 
of accounting practice, for example tax evasion, insolvency, money laundering, fraud and so on.  In 
short, most accounting research is fixated on teasing out the types of accounting information which 
is useful for investors in that it provokes a share price movement. 
 
A parallel and overlapping development of financial economics occurred in the discipline of finance  
indeed there is a significant overlay between markets-based accounting research and finance.  The 
models developed in finance were deliberately simplified so that they could take a simple 
mathematical form.  These models were frequently at odds with reality (for example, the presence 
of a risk free asset, no transactions costs and so on).  Mackenzie (2006) notes that this did not 
concern economists like Friedman (1953).   Friedman argued that models should not be judged 
according to whether their assumptions were empirically accurate -- their purpose is to make 
accurate predictions.   
 
Positive accounting (financial economics) ideas and models have been transferred to the accounting 
profession by academics who operated on both the field of academia and professional practice.  
Rochester and Chicago school graduates would come to staff the accounting profession, the media, 
think-tanks and so on.  The same happened in finance. MacKenzie (2006) writes that attractive 
consultancies and tempting job opportunities were available to academics from the 1960s onwards 
in the finance sector.  Fischer Black resigned his professorship at MIT for a post at Goldman Sachs.  
Scholes became a consultant to Salomon Brothers and later became a joint head of their group that 
traded and sold derivatives.   
 
In summary, this section briefly outlined the development of financial economic ideas in accounting 
and finance departments and the consequent implications for accounting research.  In particular, the 
anti-regulatory stance of positive accounting researchers was highlighted.  It is on the question of 
regulation that there is a stark contradiction between mainstream accounting academia and the 
accounting profession.   The response of the accounting profession to the anti-regulatory stance of 
financial economic thought alongside its contemporaneous adoption of financial economics as its 
conceptual base is discussed next. 
22
 Perhaps the seminal paper here is Ball and Brown (1968). 
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 Professional financial economic accountants 
The accounting profession, concurrently with the rise of financial economics in accounting and 
finance academia as outlined above, began formalising its conceptual base in the mid-1970s in the 
US, through FASBs first Conceptual Framework project.  Hines (1989, p 72)  writes that Conceptual 
Framework projects are used as a political resource in the professionalisation struggle during times 
of possible intervention by the state and at times of competition from other groups (see also Bryer, 
1999b; Robson, 1999).  Zhang and Andrews (2014) found the same motivations underpinning the 
most recent (and on-going) IASB/FASB Conceptual Framework project which was initiated as a 
strategic response to threats to accounting legitimacy in the form of significant criticism for its role 
in the recent financial crisis.  At the time in which Hines was writing (in the late 1980s) it was clear 
that Conceptual Framework projects were doomed to technical failure and that the major 
rationale for undertaking Conceptual Frameworks was not functional or technical but a strategic 
manoeuvre for providing legitimacy to standard-setting boards and the accounting profession 
(Hines, 1989).  It was in the interests of the accounting profession, under a powerful ideological 
attack from the Chicago School, to articulate accounting regulation to market requirements23.  
According to financial economics, this would mean moving away from a stewardship perspective 
towards a perspective which was concerned with the provision of information about future free cash 
flows for investors. 
 
Although zombieconomics is a useful analogy, unlike the instantaneous change from human to 
zombie in popular culture, ideological change occurs sometimes very slowly and that for significant 
periods of time, vestiges of previous understandings remain.  The, initially subtle, changes in 
accounting could perhaps be best summarised as a move from accounting having a stewardship 
function (a more traditional macroeconomic approach) towards an informational perspective on 
financial reporting.  This was set out in the Accounting Principles Board (APB), Statement number 4 
in 1970, which stated that the basic purpose of financial accounting is to provide information that is 
useful to owners, creditors and others in making economic decisions (APB, 1970, paras 40 and 73).  
The APB statement no 4 was reiterated later by the Trueblood Committee, although its report did 
maintain an idea of stewardship this appeared under the umbrella term accountability.  And the 
successor to the APB, the Financial Accounting Standards Boards (FASB) first Conceptual Framework 
Project made user needs a primary objective of financial reporting.  In its Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts, No 1 (1978), it states: 
 
Financial reporting should provide information that is useful to present and potential 
investors and creditors and other users in assessing the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of 
prospective cash receipts  Since investors and creditors cash flows are related to 
enterprise cash flows, financial reporting should provide information to help investors, 
creditors and others assess the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of prospective net cash 
flows to the related enterprise. (page viii) 
 
Accountings newly emerging concern with the provision of information for investment decisions 
meant that it was to look to the future rather than the transactions base of the past.  The 
accounting profession described usefulness in terms of the provision of information for market 
participants and this set in motion a gradual shift towards accounting technologies designed to place 
a value on expected income alongside an emphasis on the market24. Those who developed these 
accounting technologies drew their inspiration from a Friedmanite vision of expectations being 
23
 Chabrak (2012, p 472) argues that neo-classical economists embraced statistics and the mystique of science thus became one of the 
major neoliberal calling cards of the Chicago School (Van Horn and Mirowski, 2009, p 163).   
24
 Although individual accountants have practical difficulties with this approach, for example, the auditing of fair-value accounting (Smith-
Lacroix et al., 2012). 
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reduced to a micro-level domain of knowable outcomes with attached probabilities.  Thus the 
revolution (Beaver, 1989) in accounting led it into a world of what Marx would describe as the 
fictitious (see also Casson and Napier, 1997, cited in Power, 2010) and proved to be slippery slope 
to what Power (2010) describes as a balance sheet approach to accounting in which the balance 
sheet components (which according to financial economics, if recorded at fair value, will be able to 
give information about the future) have become meaningful rather than residual values.   
 
In summary, financial (zombie) economic rationalities have come to dominate accounting practice, 
conceptual frameworks and scholarship. These rationalities evolved in a period of economic 
downturn and part of their appeal was their promise of providing a blueprint for efficient and 
profitable organisations and information to investors about future cash flows.  The influence of 
financial economic theory on accounting research meant that, with its microeconomic frame, 
accounting research failed to see the looming economic crisis and it has failed to critically consider 
the broader social, economic, or political implications of accounting practice.   According to neo-
liberal economic rationality accounting has two dominant functions.  One is to monitor, measure and 
report on the performance metrics in inter and intra organisational contracts.  The second is to 
provide (preferably unregulated) accounting information to enable investors to assess future cash 
flows.  Importantly, akin to the way in which financial economics impacted upon accounting 
practice, MacKenzie (2006), drawing upon Callons claim that economics itself is part of the 
infrastructure of modern markets, argues that financial economics did more than analyse markets  
it altered them.  In effect, MacKenzie argued that financial economics altered the trajectory of 
financial markets.  Both accounting and finance technologies have helped to construct as well as 
reflect contemporary capitalism (see also Hines, 1988).  The next section considers the 
contemporary context in which finance capital tends to dominate industrial capital  financialisation.  
Financialisation 
The term financialisation remains ill-defined.  But for the purposes of this paper it includes the 
globalisation of financial markets, the rise in income from financial investment, the shareholder 
value revolution (Clegg et al, 2011) and the penetration of finance across all commercial relations to 
an unprecedented and direct extent (Fine, 2007b; Fine, 2008; Stockhammer, 2004).   Under neo-
liberalism all markets are highly valued, but, in the contemporary period, the markets given the 
greatest priority are those of finance.  This new dominance trailed regulatory, technological and 
economic changes.  A key regulatory change was the 1971 abandonment of the Bretton Woods 
agreement which allowed the free determination of interest rates and fewer quantitative controls 
over financial institutions.  Technology changes (especially in terms of computing and electronic 
information transfer) in the same period had a profound impact on the international financial 
system.   Economic change in the form of the 1973 oil crisis severely weakened industrial capital.  
Financial capital during this period developed an unrivalled dynamism; it became sexy.     
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to do justice to the linkages between financialisation and neo-
liberalism.  Different writers see different linkages between the two. Some link the rise of neo-
liberalism to the growing role and power of finance in the political economy of capitalism. For 
example, Dumenil and Levy (2004, 1-2), argue that "...neoliberalism is the expression of the desire of 
a class of capitalist owners and the institutions in which their power is concentrated, which we 
collectively call 'finance,' to restore ... the class's revenues and power..."  While others (Kotz and 
McDonough, 2010), see financialisation as part of the cyclical nature of capitalism.  Kotz and 
McDonough (2010) argue that an earlier form of financial dominance arose in the late 
nineteenth/early twentieth centuries, and consequently they see an expanding role for finance in 
economic activity as part of a periodic change in the capitalist institutional structure.  Of course it is 
possible that financial capital is involved in a project to restore class power and that 
financialisation is cyclical.   
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 The contemporary expansion of finance capital is mainly unrelated to expansion of lending to 
industrial corporations for purposes of investment and production (Fine et al, 1999).  In part, 
financialisation has meant the proliferation of purely financial markets and fictitious capital 
instruments, some of which do not bridge to real activities.   However, financialisations reach 
extends beyond the realm of corporate finance.   For example, it has impacted upon the natural 
environment with futures trading in carbon-offsets25 (Fine, 2008)26 and, as we will see next, 
individuals have become financialized.     
 
Neo-liberal economic rationality which sees the states role solely as providing the conditions to 
allow markets to flourish has made it virtually illegitimate for the state to involve itself in economic 
interventions to promote full employment or other policies which enabled the post-war boom27.  At 
the same time, many state safety-nets have been removed.  These policy changes have forced 
citizens into their own private financialized worlds such that the financial economic idea of rational 
expectations in which individuals optimise by modelling the economy has become a stark and 
painful reality (Bay, 2011).   The removal of collectivised state social provisions means that  many 
risks28 have been transferred to citizens who have had to suddenly make their own provision for 
financial security, childrens education, housing, social care, and capacity to survive unemployment 
or illness; at the same time, collective provision through trade unions has been discouraged (Wilby, 
2009).  This placing of risk onto the individual has made them into two-legged cost and profit centres 
(Blackburn, 2006) in search of the best financial deals.  Deregulation and internet search engines 
mean that individuals have to search for the cheapest car insurance, mortgage, utility prices, savings 
accounts and so on.  Even everyday consumption has become a game of risk (Martin, 2002). Buying 
an airline ticket, booking a hotel, buying petrol, all involve risk management ploys with the best 
deals going to the savvy market players, the clever risk takers (ONeill, 2008, p 9). For many 
workers, without enough money for the essentials of life, borrowing (frequently at immorally high 
rates of interest) has become the norm and so interest rate risk is unavoidable (Elliott and Atkinson, 
1998).  The transfer of pension provision from defined benefit to contribution schemes has meant 
that millions will be dependent on the price of stocks and bonds to enable them to retire.  
Financialisation means that individuals behave like businesses, businesses like banks and banks like 
hedge funds (Blackburn, 2006). Failure (homelessness, unemployment, and death through lack of 
the money for health care) is seen as the fault of the individual rather than caused by any wider 
social or economic force (Martin, 2002)29.   And yet, the elimination of employment opportunities, 
through company strategic decisions to maximise their current share price, by for example, the 
introduction of zero-hours contracts, mass redundancies and so on, is an important ideologically 
driven mechanism of financialisation. 
 
The maximization of shareholder value is a guiding principle of financialisation.  The institutional 
setting for this is that a significant majority of shares are owned by institutional investors and the 
vast majority of share trading (70+%) arises from companies using high-frequency trading strategies. 
These types of shareholders are looking for short term share-price increases.  This means that the 
restructuring of productive capital is sacrificed for realisation of short-term gains or shareholder 
25
 Fine makes the point that Commodity fetishism has surely arrived at perfection when we can buy and sell in a market for not producing 
something in the future (especially when, in fact, carbon trading is about allowing that undesirable carbon to be produced for you by 
someone else as well as yourself on the grounds that they might produce less of it than you would if you were producing what they 
produce as well as what you yourself will carry on producing). 
26
 Some of the social consequences of financialisation are horrendous.  Fine (2008) gives the example that hundreds of millions of people 
are more at risk from starvation because of trading in commodities futures.   
27
 Stiglitz (2002) argues that the vested interest and ideology of finance lie behind poor policy 
28
 It is beyond the scope of this paper, but for those interested, an interesting debate surrounding risk from the perspective of both capital 
and labour can be found in Harney (2010) and Toms (2010). 
29
 The individualising of failure has a long history in the US, as was charted by Sandage (2005).  Arthur Miller commenting on Sandage 
(2005) stated that, I found Born Losers a confirmation of an old belief that in American history there is a crash in every generation 
sufficient to mark us with a kind of congenital fear of failure. (see http://www.history.cmu.edu/faculty/sandage.html) 
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value (Fine, 2008b).  Management, through the reward of share options, are incentivised to 
maximize shareholder value in the short term, by any means possible, even if this means shrinking 
productive capacity.  As Fine (2008b) writes, Rossman and Greenfield (2006, p 2, italics added) citing 
Stockhammer (2004)-- 
 
Of course, companies have always sought to maximize profit. What is new is the drive for 
profit through the elimination of productive capacity and employment. Transnational food 
processors, for example, now invest a significantly lower proportion of their profits in 
expanding productive capacity. Financial markets today directly reward companies for 
reducing payroll through closures, restructuring and outsourcing. This reflects the way in 
which financialization has driven the management of non-financial companies to act more 
like financial market players.   
 
A broader macroeconomic analysis would show that the pursuit of shareholder value maximisation 
could mean that the system is killing itself.  It is doing this on many different fronts.  It is severely 
shrinking its own pool of customers (Stout, 2012).   And some companies are buying back their own 
shares in order to increase shareholder value at the expense of long term investment in the 
company (see for example, Lazonick et al, 2013).  Non-financial companies have been accruing 
increasing proportions of their profits from financial activity (Clegg et al, 2011).  Stockhammer (2004) 
using data from the 1960s to the 1990s argues that financialisation explains the entire slowdown in 
accumulation in France and a third of the slowdown in the US. It has created a dynamic in which real 
accumulation is both tempered and, ultimately, choked off by fictitious accumulation.   
 
In summary, while financialisation, what it is, and its roots are nebulous, it is clear that the 
globalisation of financial markets, the shareholder value revolution, and the patterns of institutional 
shareholding and their trading strategies has had profound detrimental effects on individuals and on 
economic activity. Finance capital also contributed to the recent crisis in other ways.  In the search 
for profitable returns, new and sophisticated financial instruments have been created by financial 
institutions which are increasingly removed from the value creation process.  Since money flows to 
where it can earn the greatest returns, investments have been made in a myriad of forms of 
fictitious capital, rather than in the real economy (Harvey, 2006, p 254).  Harvey (2006) explains that 
Marxs primary purpose in his discussion of fictitious capital is to disabuse us of the idea that a 
marketable claim upon some future revenue is a real form of capital.  He wishes to alert us to the 
insanity of a society in which investment in fictitious capital appears just as important as investment 
in real capital (production).   The next section deals with the role of fictitious capital and 
financialisation in the recent crisis in more depth.  
The growth of fictitious capital and the recent crisis  
While Marx could perhaps not have envisaged the exact forms of fictitious capital which were likely 
to emerge in the 21st century, the idea that fictitious capital should be distinguished from real 
capital which is capital invested in the means of production enables an understanding of the risks 
which lie behind the activities of banks and financial institutions at the end of the 20th and beginning 
of the 21st centuries.   Contemporary forms of fictitious capital are traded through many different 
markets with varying degrees of regulation and include stocks and shares, bonds, derivatives30, 
collateralized debt (or loan) obligations and numerous other asset classes31 and financial 
instruments.   Deutsche Börse AG (2008) explains that the number of OTC-traded derivatives is 
unlimited in principle as they are customized and new contracts are created continuously. A broad 
30
 These can be traded on derivatives exchanges but also bilaterally between market participants. The latter segment  i.e. the OTC 
segment  currently accounts for around 84 percent of the derivatives market and operate with almost complete disregard of national 
borders. 
31
 For example the securitized future gate receipts at Manchester United. 
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universe of exchange traded derivatives exists as well: for example, over 1,700 different derivatives 
are listed on the three major global derivatives exchanges.32  The derivatives market has grown 
significantly  around 24 per cent per year from 1995 until 2008  into a global market with about 
457 trillion of notional amount outstanding33.  By this measure, the derivatives market is more than 
four times larger than the combined global equity and bond markets measured by market 
capitalization34.  
 
Until 25 years ago, the derivatives market was small and domestic and mainly served the function of 
risk hedging.  The derivatives market emerged at the time of the end of dollar-gold convertibility in 
1971 at which time, currency values, especially for the dollar, became much more volatile (McNally, 
2009).   Early derivatives served as a response to the risks confronting capital due to volatile 
currency markets.  For example, a UK exporter of goods to the US, could take a short position for the 
amount they are due to receive in order to hedge their foreign exchange risk35.   As in an earlier 
capitalist period, modern fictitious capital has played an important role in the capital accumulation 
process. But while early derivatives contracts had the function of eliminating risk, many later 
became purely speculative (McNally, 2009), or as Deutsche Börse (2008) put it, the wide variety of 
derivative contracts allow innovative investment strategies (p 4).    
 
An excellent example of a form of fictitious capital which can play a useful role in the capital 
accumulation process but also provides a source of vulnerability is a Credit Default Swap (CDS).  A 
CDS is essentially an insurance policy taken as a protection against default by a borrower.   The 
danger lies in naked CDSs, which can be purchased by those who are not owed any money (for 
example if they do not own the bond).  Thus it is possible to bet on a company, in which you have 
absolutely no interest, defaulting on its debt.   Naked CDSs account for 80% of the CDS market but 
they create terrible incentives.  For example, following Shaxson (2013), it is entirely possible for a 
Private Equity Company to borrow money to take a controlling interest in a (lets say) clothing 
company, then dramatically cut costs by whatever means possible (cutting wages, avoiding pension 
obligations, sweating assets and so on); the consequential enhanced cash flow projection can be 
taken to a bank and borrowed against. If, the bank is prepared to loan (say) £3m, the Private Equity 
Company can take the whole £3m cash as a bonus and not invest any of it in the clothes company 
although the debt will belong to the clothes company and not the Private Equity Company.  At this 
stage the Private Equity Company could also purchase a naked CDS on the clothes company while 
continuing to syphon off as much money from the company as possible, including not paying any 
tax.  The heavily indebted, demoralised company may then collapse.  Aside from the £3m bonus and 
any other money siphoned from the company, the Private Equity Company will be able to profit 
from the collapse through the naked CDS.  If this occurs in the UK, in all likelihood any tax owing will 
never be paid since the taxation authority would be an unsecured creditor.  This is unproductive rent 
extraction (Shaxson, 2013 provides similar examples).   
 
While there are many different forms of derivatives36, the global financial structure started to 
crumble when a particular form of derivative (Collateralized Debt Obligation) was impacted by some 
of the other outcomes of financialisation -- falling wages levels, the choking off of real accumulation 
32
 Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Eurex and Euronext.Liffe 
33
 The Global Derivatives Market: An Introduction -Deutsche Börse AG (Apr 2008) 
34
 However, the estimated gross market values of all derivatives outstanding total only 10 trillion, which is much lower than the equity 
(43 trillion market capitalization) and bond markets (55 trillion market capitalization).   
35
 So, for example, if a British Export Company is due to deliver goods to a US customer and be paid US$1,500 in six months time, it might 
enter into a derivatives contract in which it agrees to sell US$1,500 at a rate of US$1.50 = £1, thereby ensuring that it will receive a certain 
£1,000 when the goods are delivered.   
36
It is also possible to purchase weather derivatives offering compensation if temperatures at a specified location exceed or fall below a 
predefined reference temperature.  While this type of derivative might serve to reduce the risk of a highly specialised farmer, arguably, it 
exemplifies the speculative nature of many derivatives.  The vast majority of derivatives are tremendously risky  and their level of risk is 
extremely difficult to measure. 
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and unemployment.   Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) became popular around 200037 and 
were seemingly less risky than other derivatives because they were backed by assets (peoples 
homes).  In spite of the potential for a collapse in the housing market (for example, because of falling 
real incomes in the US), the credit rating agencies38 failed to adequately reflect the risks associated 
with many mortgage-backed CDOs.  After months of negotiations with JP Morgan the bank which 
devised CDOs they were awarded the highest possible grade (Tett, 2009).  Many CDOs consisted of 
subprime mortgages and offered higher rates of return aligned to a safe credit rating. Clegg et al 
(2011) note a central flaw in the CDO scheme, that appears to have been totally missed by the highly 
paid bankers and credit rating agencies, which is that in the sub-prime mortgage market defaults will 
in all likelihood be synchronised.  This makes CDO failures very different from corporate sector 
failures which typically take place at different times for different reasons.   
 
The first signs of the looming crisis appeared in the US when there was a rapid increase in mortgage 
delinquencies and foreclosures and CDOs became worthless.39  What is perhaps unique to the recent 
crisis is that families and individuals were more quickly and intimately hurt by the crisis than ever 
before because of personal-financialisation (as explained earlier).  The crisis did not just spread to 
households through unemployment but through low wages.  So demand fell very quickly 
exacerbating the crisis. 
 
A Marxist definition of an economic crisis, as Harvey (2006, 2011) sets out, is a situation in which 
surplus capital and surplus labour exist side by side with seemingly no way to put them back 
together40.  He called this over-accumulation.  Kunkell (2011) points out that in the US, 
corporations are sitting on almost two trillion dollars in cash while unemployment hovers just below 
10 per cent (Kunkel, 2011).  In other words investors (perhaps because they are looking for short-
term profits  or shareholder value maximisation) are not investing in opportunities, which will 
create new jobs (Harvey, 2011) and so create a demand-led recovery41.   In the recent crisis, 
alongside over-accumulation, we also have had over-financialisation.  The crisis has been 
exacerbated by the speculative bubble in certain derivatives and other extreme forms of fictitious 
capital (Harvey, 2006).  At this stage it is important to note that, while it might appear as if the origin 
of the 2008 crisis was financialisation and the new insane forms of financial manipulations, crises are 
relatively concrete phenomena which reflect the deeper, more abstract, contradictory character of 
capitalist economic relations (Fine et al, 1999).   
 
Marx demonstrates that they are surface froth upon much deeper currents making for 
disequilibrium.    The difficulty here is to disentangle the pure surface froth of perpetual 
speculation from the deeper rhythms of crisis formation in production. (Harvey, 2006 p 325)   
 
Thus whatever forms a capitalist crisis takes there are common problems which occur.  There is the 
persistent contradiction that individual companies try to reduce their wage bills while hoping that 
other employers pay sufficient wages to enable people to buy their products.  And once a crisis 
37
 Tett, 2009, provides an extraordinary account of the development of CDOs from the perspective of the bankers who devised CDOs at JP 
Morgans. 
38
 Butler (2009) argues that credit rating agencies and auditors fees are paid by directors and traders who are motivated to hide bad news 
and credit risk.  They may maximize their fees by giving assurances too liberally.   
39
 Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, THE STATE OF THE NATIONS HOUSING (2008) 
40
 Labour availability is no problem now for capital, and it has not been for the last 25 years. But disempowered labour means low wages, 
and impoverished workers do not constitute a vibrant market. Persistent wage repression therefore poses the problem of lack of demand 
for the expanding output of capitalist corporations. One barrier to capital accumulation  the labour question  is overcome at the 
expense of creating another  lack of a market. (Harvey, 2006, pp) 
41
 In the short-run people maintained a certain standard of living by borrowing.  According to a recent Citizens Advice 
Bureau factsheet, total personal debt in the UK currently stands at £1.46 trillion. The average household debt in the UK is 
£8,920 (excluding mortgages). This figure increases to £18,583 if the average is based on the number of households who 
have some form of unsecured loan (www.citizensadvice.org.uk/pdf_the_value_of_debt_advice.pdf accessed 20th October, 
2011) 
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begins, and individuals and companies are unable to make interest and other payments, they will be 
forced to sell their assets cheaply.  Even profitable businesses can be forced to close due to 
tightening credit.  In this way, a crisis in the fictitious economy can spread to the real economy 
(McNally, 2009).  Marx states that a crisis involves a destruction of capital. The values of fictitious 
capitals  all kinds of paper assets  which were previously treated as if they were real assets 
become, as stated earlier, worth as much a losing book-makers betting slip.  At the same time, real 
capital is destroyed as companies go into liquidation (McNally, 2009)42.    
 
A further concern with modern day capitalism, even in times of stability, is that investors pursue 
high private returns, not high social returns (Kunkell, 2011).  And speculative bubbles can occur 
rather than investment in things which society needs.  As Stiglitz (2010) observes The world is 
currently faced with serious challenges that also present investment opportunities: retrofitting the 
world economy to face the challenges of global warming, or making the investment necessary to 
reduce global poverty. There is no shortage of opportunities for investments with high social 
returns.  But, some investors deliberately chose to invest in things with negative social returns 
through speculative attacks.  The objective of a speculative attack is to generate profits for the 
speculators, regardless of the cost to the rest of society. They can make money by inducing panic 
and then feel pleased with their insight: their concerns were justified, but only because of the 
responses to which their actions gave rise (Stiglitz, 2010, p 17).  This explains why some derivatives 
traders and investors (for example those investing in naked credit default swaps) will become very 
rich when companies fail.  They therefore benefit from the misery of the individuals who have lost 
their livelihoods.  Indeed some speculators gamble on this very thing. 
 
This section set out the scale of the growth of fictitious capital in the run up to 2008.  It argued that 
while some forms of fictitious capital were intended to reduce risk, others introduce significant risk 
into the system.  However, risky derivatives were not the sole cause of the banking crisis.  Earlier in 
the paper it was argued that most accounting research is unable to comprehend or investigate the 
broader social and economic implications of market activity.  Nevertheless organisations do have to 
produce financial statements. Fine (1999, p 73) states that while industrial accumulation is 
confronted with a predatory and destructive explosion of financial accumulation, international 
authorities limit themselves to mealy-mouthed platitudes about transparency and accountability of 
financial institutions.  In market economies the ideological mantra of equality, freedom and fairness 
is profound, as is the belief in professions which will, articulated to this ideology, act in the public 
interest and render organisations accountable.  Under financialisation the accounting profession 
with its financial economics conceptual base has served its own interests (as well as those of its 
paymasters) by providing accounts which act as a transparency and accountability veil.   Arnold 
(2009, p 804) explains that financial reporting rules governing off-balance sheet structured 
investment vehicles (SIVs), including rules on special purpose entities (SPEs), qualified special 
purpose entities (QSPEs) and variable interest entities, were significant in the recent crisis.  In 
effect, accounting rules were complicit in the creation of a shadow banking system.  Although 
accounting information is important since it is part of the legitimating structures of society, it is more 
than just ideological  it is a technology.  In the next section we turn to the role of accounting 
standard setters and accounting technologies in the financial crisis.   
42
 The situation is exacerbated by the unequal distribution of pain, reflecting the unequal distribution of gain in better 
economic times.  Those with the least power (and the highest marginal propensity to consume, and thus more likely to 
help regenerate the economy) fare worst.  While it is beyond the scope of this paper, this insight demonstrates the 
psychosis of the current austerity measures. 
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Accounting and the financial crisis. 
In this section it will be argued that the context in which the accounting profession operates is 
important for analysing accountings complicity in the crisis.  Accounting standard setters are subject 
to significant pressure by their various paymasters and the accounting profession and its various 
sub-fields (auditing, standard setting and so on) are in a constant battle to maintain their structural 
position in the field of business and vis-à-vis the state, especially since the financial crisis (Bengtsson, 
2011).  The institutional domain of accounting standard setting is considered first. 
 
Accounting regulation private and international 
An essential feature of the accounting standard setting regime in the 21st century is that it is private 
and increasingly international in character43.  Nölke and Perry (2007) argue that the adoption, in July 
2002, by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (EU) of a regulation 
requiring more than 7,000 EU stock exchange-listed companies to use International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) was one of the most wide-
ranging delegations of public authority to a private, business-funded, and business-led, body within 
international politics (Nölke and Perry, 2007).  Although the state has not been totally usurped by 
private international accounting standard setters since each standard only becomes binding when 
endorsed by, depending on the jurisdiction, a state sector body (see also Arnold and Sikka, 2001).  
More recently the EU forced the IASB to change its rules for certain aspects of hedge accounting as a 
direct result of pressure from banks.  As a result there are two versions of IAS 39 (EU version and 
IASB version).   Nölke and Perry, (2007, p 1) state that (N)evertheless, within these qualifications 
the IASB44 is still one of the most amazing cases of delegation of authority to a private body in 
international politics.  In practice, it would be extremely difficult in a globalised world for any 
country not to adopt either US or international accounting standards.  For example, without these 
accounting standards in place, it would be difficult for any country to attract inward investment or 
IMF and World Bank loans.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this but International 
Accounting Standards present a contradiction.  While neoliberal fundamentalists argue for less rules 
and regulations, in the current neo-liberal period, accounting rules have become ubiquitous through 
international standards45.   
 
Although they have become international, accounting standard setters and the accounting firms that 
oversee standard application are constantly fighting to maintain and enhance their position 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992)46 and are under pressure from fractional interests.  They walk a 
tightrope in that they have to please their paymasters while at the same time appearing to make 
rules to police their paymasters in order to maintain their legitimating role.  This balancing act has 
proved problematic for accounting professionals.  There is always the potential for new bodies to 
enter the fray to usurp the lucrative market for accounting services.  For example, Power (2010) 
notes the re-emergence of the International Valuation Standards Council (IVSC) in 2009.  The IVSC 
criticised the IASB exposure draft on fair value measurement for being too narrowly prescriptive 
about the range of possible valuation methods arguing that the IASB should restrict itself to 
principles leaving space for the development of detailed valuation methods (IVSC, 2009).  If the 
IVSCs pronouncements better serve the interests of IASBs paymasters, the IASB could find itself 
increasingly replaced by a more friendly body.  In a study of Canadian auditors, Smith-Lacroix et al 
(2012) found that auditors needed the support of valuation specialists when trying to audit fair value 
43
 Cooper and Sherer (1984) described the non-neutral role of standard setters at a time when arguably standard setters were more under 
the control of the state, or at least were more contained within national boundaries.   
44
 International Accounting Standards Board 
45
 Accounting standards enable the market system. Mark to market is used when prices are high (attracting more gamblers). When there is 
a market down-turn, mark to market allows companies to fix the price. This means that losses are limited so avoiding the disappointment 
of market players.  
46
 As in any field, the accounting field is rife with on field battles.  For example, in the UK after the financial crisis the House of Lords set up 
an inquiry to examine the impact of the lack of competition in the audit market and scrutinise the role of the Big 4.  Potential competitor 
firms to the Big 4, like BDO, gave evidence against the Big 4.    
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accounting numbers.  Perhaps, unsurprisingly, the uncertainty has proved to be rather lucrative for 
accountants  enabling them to earn higher fees.  The field of accounting has become rather 
unstable.  It is possible that large accounting firms (like the big 4) might decouple themselves from 
traditional standard setters if principles prove to be more profitable than detailed rules.   And, 
international accounting standard setters are increasingly becoming decoupled from their 
professional base (the professional accounting bodies donated symbolic capital by various nation 
states) (Power, 2010).   The loss of the symbolic capital of professionalism is a threat to the power 
of accounting bodies (Ramirez, 2001, Walker, 2004). The financial crisis and the criticism of the 
accounting professions information provision, standards, and auditing exacerbated this threat to 
the legitimacy and symbolic capital of the profession (for example, Gup and Lutton, 2009; 
Krumwiede, 2008; Laux and Leuz, 2009; Sikka, 2009).   
 
In summary, accounting regulations of international scope are set by privately funded organisations.  
This means that there is always the possibility that funding could be withdrawn and/or new bodies 
could emerge to oust the extant accounting regulators.  Aside from the embedded ideology of neo-
liberalism, the institutional context of accounting regulation makes it likely that accounting 
technologies will be produced which accommodate the interests of business. The implications of this 
section in terms of understanding accountings role in the crisis is that the institutional structures of 
accounting standard setting mean that the kinds of rules needed to help regulate markets and 
curtail some of the more dangerous forms of speculation so desperately needed before (and since 
the crisis) can never be forthcoming.  The financial economic rationalities embedded in the 
professional conceptual frameworks of the accounting profession will have blinkered it to the havoc 
created by neo-liberalism and financialisation everywhere except in markets; in the case of havoc 
being wrought in markets measures are being taken, for example fair value accounting can be 
dropped (see further discussion below).  And even if accounting standard setters feel an obligation 
to society in general, their funding would be removed if they failed to develop standards which 
legitimize, sustain and enable financialisation.   Accounting has long been a technological facilitator 
for capitalism.  The paper now turns to the more technical aspects of accounting. 
 
Accounting technologies and the financial crisis 
Accountings entrenchment in the economic system meant that in many ways, accounting played a 
similar role in the recent crisis as it did in earlier ones47.  Marxist theory would argue that accounting 
technologies play a key role in the control of labour and the extraction of surplus value from labour 
by increasing productivity and reducing wages and so are part of the creation of a crisis of 
overproduction in which there is an excess of production (supply) and inadequate demand. Bryer 
(2006b) uses Marx's theory of the labour process to argue that accounting is the premier control 
system because it provides senior managers with objective measures of the generation and 
realisation of surplus value (see also Armstrong, 1985; Marsden, 1998)48.   
 
The very poor quality of financial accounting was also a feature of the crisis.  For example, in the 
weekend before the demise of Lehman Brothers, the bankers and regulators working in the 
headquarters of the New York Federal Reserve, were reportedly told by one of Lehmans bankers, 
We have no idea of the details of our derivatives exposure and neither do you. (Guerrera and 
Bullock, 2008).   The accounting rules regarding derivatives were clearly problematic.  In the run up 
to the crisis, the accounting rules which allowed some assets to be shown at cost, others at fair value 
and others not at all (through structured investment and other vehicles) meant that financial 
47
 The links between capitalism and accounting are profound Chiapello (2007) argues that capitalism, and double-entry bookkeeping 
practice, which highlights and sustains the circuit of capital, are inextricably linked.  She further argues that the philosophy of capitalism is 
entrenched in accounting.   
48
 Accounting technologies too were a key feature of other facets of the neo-liberal project, for example privatisations (see for example, 
Arnold and Cooper, 1999; Cooper and Taylor, 2005).   
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institutions were accounting on an inconsistent basis49 and the accounting rules made it fairly easy 
for financial institutions to hide their losses (Butler, 2009).  Accounting also enabled what has come 
to be described as a cookie jar approach to reporting profits and losses which allowed companies 
to hide and release profits in order to reduce volatility, thus making companies appear less risky.   
For example, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight produced a report on accounting 
irregularities at Fannie Mae.  This report revealed that the management of Fannie Mae wished to 
promote the image that it was a low risk enterprise that made substantial profits.  So in profitable 
years the company would create artificial provisions that would reduce profits and in loss making 
years would release these provisions.  Aside from hiding the significant risks the company was 
taking, this accounting tactic benefitted management who took bonuses for meeting profit targets 
every year rather than for only the genuinely profitable years. 
 
This section argued that accounting technologies in general contributed to the crisis. Management 
accounting technologies contribute to the crisis tendencies of capitalism through their drive to 
reduce wages.  And In the run up to the crisis the erroneous financial accounting signals were 
produced by financial institutions aggravated the tendencies towards disproportionality and over-
accumulation50.  While other facets of accounting contributed to the crisis, the aspect of accounting 
which has come under most scrutiny since the crisis is fair value accounting. The growth of 
derivatives placed increasing pressure on accounting standard setters to develop new standards and 
was the catalyst for the expansion of fair value accounting (FVA) (Power, 2010).  In practice, the 
speed and magnitude of the creation of derivatives meant that accounting standard setters were a 
few steps behind the increasingly avaricious, powerful and innovative finance industry (Davenport, 
2004).   The next section discusses this further. 
 
Accounting standards for derivatives and fair value accounting  
Although fair value accounting which privileges market values is ideologically consistent with 
financial economics, it was not a new technique having it origins as early as 1800 in French and 
German accounting regulation especially with respect to inventory valuation (Richard, 200551) and 
the 1930s in the US (Cascini and DelFavero, 2011).  Fair value as a term was typically used by 
accountants in the 1970s to mean the total amount of (revalued) net assets of a company, in the 
case of a merger or acquisition, for the purpose of calculating goodwill.  The first major step towards 
implementing FVA in its contemporary form, occurred in December 1975, as the FASB issued 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 12 (FAS12) (Cascini and DelFavero, 2011). This was 
the first time that, the FASB allowed companies, to report unrealized losses and unrealized gains on 
marketable securities in income52.   This was a significant turning point since it legitimated and 
institutionalised a practice which would come to enable the speculative bubble and which was 
associated with one of the key popular concerns of the banking crisis  executive pay.  Companies in 
the finance industry do not have to wait until a financial product is sold before they can recognize a 
profit.  This is consistent with the balance sheet approach.  A hedge fund manager can calculate the 
difference between the original purchase price and the fair value of a product to determine their 
profit and hence their bonus.   
 
The FASB began working on a standard for derivatives around 1992, and took several years to come 
up with one.  When large financial institutions didnt like their proposal, they tried to have FASB 
49
 Of course this is ideologically consistent with the financial (zombie) economic doxa that companies should be allowed to account for 
things in their own way.   
50
 See Shaxson, 2013, which explains how financial institutions use annualised IRR calculations which massively overstate returns.   
51
 Richard (this special issue) further argues that as a result of accounting measures being modified at certain points in history, capitalists 
recognize profits at an increasingly rapid pace following their initial investment, which, in turn, increases their eagerness to capture the 
fruits of those investments as soon as possible 
52
 Although this was with the proviso that companies could only report unrealized gains in income for financial instruments where 
previous write-downs occurred. (Cascini and DelFavero, 2011, p 1).   
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abolished and some withdrew funding from the FASB (Economist, 199853).  The arguments of the key 
players in the standard setting process were interesting and complex.  For example, in the 1990s 
standard setters (IASB and FASB) wanted to distinguish between speculative hedges and risk 
removing ones (eg foreign exchange hedges linked to overseas sales54 from naked CDSs) (Bruce, 
1994).  But, it was argued that accounting standard setters could not write standards with sufficient 
detail to preclude financial engineering designed to hide more than it reveals55; nor could they write 
standards which can judge the intentions of companies in terms of whether they are taking risk 
avoidance measures or speculating (Scott Taub, the deputy chief accountant at the Securities and 
Exchange Commission).     
 
Although the expansion of derivatives could be seen as a catalyst for the expansion of fair value 
accounting, under pressure from business, the accounting profession has also allowed valuations of 
traded assets to be based on financial models.  This is another neo-liberal paradox.  While the 
theoretical adherence to market perfection and information usefulness remains in place, the 
practice of accounting is, when it suits the parties involved, rather different.  Consequently, in the 
case of illiquid assets, financial institutions can choose the assumptions which go into their asset 
and liability valuation models in order to maximise bonuses.   The extreme case of this is the level 3 
inputs of FAS 157, issued in 2006, in which assets and liabilities are measured according to models 
like the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).  As suggested to earlier - there are serious problems 
with these models (see Toms, 2006).  For example, the CAPM has problems both in terms of its basic 
assumptions and consequently in the possibility of empirically testing it.  Theoretically according to 
the CAPM, the market portfolio includes all the assets which investors hold (including land, slaves, 
paintings and so on).  It also posits the existence of a risk-free investment possibility.  In practice, 
the CAPM uses stock indices as a substitute for the market portfolio.  Roll (1977) demonstrated that 
this substitution is problematic since the inability to view the true market portfolio could mean that 
the CAPM may not be empirically testable.  Furthermore, the CAPM is based upon the belief that the 
market is perfectly efficient.  In other words, each investor is given the same information and 
understands that information in the same way and can act upon that information.  This renders the 
CAPM empirically untestable since such test would suffer from the Duhem jointness of testing 
problem (Hines, 1988b).  Mark to model accounting could perhaps be more realistically described as 
mark-to-myth accounting.  This form of valuation has proved to be attractive in the financial 
community since it can smooth the volatility that mark-to-market accounting may have produced in 
times of volatile markets.   
 
Overall the new accounting standards relating to derivatives and fair value are extremely complex 
and contain hundreds of different rules, some of which conflict with each other (Butler, 2009).  The 
FASB and IASBs standards do not converge (Baluch et al, 2011).  In any case, once standards are set, 
companies can interpret accounting standards in various different ways to suit their own ends.  In 
practice an auditor might arrive at a financial institution to be confronted by an extremely complex 
instrument (that they may not understand) and be asked to sign off on the way in which the 
institution had decided to account for it.  Smith-Lacroix et als (2012) study of the auditing of fair 
values in Canada concluded that (p 50) It is probably no exaggeration to argue that to a significant 
extent, financial statements predicated on standards of fair value can be understood as being 
constructed through negotiations surrounding guesstimates  though being produced through 
53
http://find.galegroup.com/econ/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECON&userGroupName=ustrath&tabID=T003&docPage=article&d
ocId=GP4100289930&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0, accessed 1
st
 Dec 2011; THE ECONOMIST January 17, 1998 BUSINESS: 
AMERICA V THE WORLD: ACCOUNTING STANDARDS IN DISPUTE 
54
 Of course it might be difficult for an individual firm in the UK to find a firm in the US with exactly the same contract date and amount of 
money and so financial institutions have a role to play in enabling hedging of foreign exchange risk.   Their commission could be seen as 
their share of the surplus value realised by the firms who wish to hedge their exchange risk.  There might be a power battle over the size 
of commissions.  Bankers who make money without producing anything may be described as parasites; nonetheless, in the specific case 
outlined here, their profits are ultimately derived from real production.    
55
 Wittgenstein would argue that rules cannot be divorced from their context.   
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apparently legitimate and powerful valuation techniques. Kahneman (2011) suggests that people 
are very reluctant to admit that they have trouble in evaluating their own judgments and that 
declarations of high confidence (of the type required by under pressure auditors) frequently tell you 
that individuals have constructed a coherent story in their minds; not one that is necessarily true.  
Within the framework of accounting, there is always room for manoeuvre by experts. 
 
In practice the major accounting firms in the US and Europe were directly involved in the process of 
securitisation and structured finance.  Arnold (2009, p 804) states that, in their capacity as advisors 
to investment banking clients, the major firms performed due diligence work, offered accounting 
and tax advice on off-balance sheet vehicles and assisted with the securitisation of trillions of dollars 
of mortgage backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).   
 
It is not argued here that, in the choice between historical cost accounting, fair value accounting or 
even mark-to-model accounting, that one is superior to another, but that financial institutions can 
embrace (for example) fair values when it suits them, and make arguments against them when it 
does not.  Although, mark-to-model accounting is more open to manipulation, there is significant 
negotiation between the auditor and auditee in all fair value accounting numbers (Smith-Lacroix et 
al, 2012).  The needs of individual capitalists frequently come into conflict with those of other 
capitalists.  This means that it sometimes suits different companies to have different valuation 
techniques.  Laux and Leuz, (2009), note that in the second half of 2008 when the crisis intensified, 
some banks raised concerns about the use of FVA, arguing that the use of market values was 
creating a downward spiral.   However, other banks, for example, Credit Suisse (2008) and JP 
Morgan (2008) argued against a suspension of FVA and defended it even during the crisis. Laux and 
Leuz (2009) suggest that the arguments could be self-serving, essentially passing the blame for the 
crisis to accounting standards. The creation of accounting standards for derivatives is a highly 
contested terrain.  Fair-value accounting and accounting for derivatives56 can take many different 
forms depending on the strengths of the various fractional interests to influence the final accounting 
standard.   
 
Since the crisis new accounting standards have been issued, some of which have closed certain of 
the gaps, for example IAS 39 (Financial Instruments Recognition and Measurement) attempted to 
close the loophole which allowed derivatives to be kept off-balance sheet and it bases the 
classification and accounting of financial instruments as assets or liabilities on management intent.  
For example, if management say that they are holding an asset as available-for-sale (AFS) then it 
must be shown on the balance sheet at market value and any change in the market value must go 
through the profit and loss account.  Whereas if management say that an asset is to be held-to-
maturity (HTM) it would be held on the balance sheet at amortized cost regardless of its current 
market price.  The exception to this is if a credit event occurs in which case the asset must be written 
down with the difference going through the profit and loss account.  IAS 39 became relevant in the 
recent Greek debt crisis.  Under IAS 39 accounting rules any sale of a bond at less than its book 
value, will crystallise a derecognition loss based on the sales proceeds. Any derecognition impacts 
both bonds held as available-for-sale (AFS) and held-to-maturity (HTM).  However, there is still a way 
for banks to avoid derecognition losses.  The IFRS system is principle-based, so it is potentially 
possible to persuade auditors to accept accounting results based on a substance over form 
argument.   In the case of a bond exchange such as that contemplated in the Institute of 
International Finance Offer in the Greek banking sector, the argument would be that the exchange 
was economically equivalent to agreeing to extend the term of an existing bond and the fact that 
this had been achieved by substituting a new (longer) bond for the original shorter one was 
irrelevant from an accounting perspective. 
56
 For example there are significant differences between IAS 39 (Financial Instruments Recognition and Measurement) and FAS 133 
(Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities) 
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 This section briefly argued that fair value accounting is not a new concept and that accounting 
standard setters took several years to come up with a standard for derivatives.  They had to confront 
the difficulties of understanding very complex instruments while also wanting to distinguish risk 
reducing derivatives from speculative ones.  At the same time they were under the usual financial 
pressure from their paymasters.  In terms of their role in the crisis both accounting regulations and 
accounting firms were complicit in the creation of a shadow banking system enabled massive 
amounts of off-balance sheet accounting and legitimated and realised speculative gains and losses.  
The rules on the recognition and measurement of financial instruments deliberately handed 
accounting choices to companies allowing them to persuade auditors and accountants to 
produce and sign off partial accounting statements.   These practices gesture towards the solution 
to the paradox that the accounting regulatory system is expanding during a period in which the 
dominant rationality is anti-regulation.  In practice, while companies may complain about how 
expensive regulation is, they have much freedom in the way in which their accounts are produced 
(very much akin to Watts and Zimmermans accounting preferences outlined earlier)57.  While it is 
certainly the case that neo-liberal accounting regulations can take many different forms depending 
upon the outcomes of complex unpredictable battles; importantly for this paper, the battles, and 
stakes are all based upon identical economic rationalities.  These rationalities enable those involved 
in the battles to understand their interests in identical ways  maximization of their individual 
wealth and fulfilment of individual contracts.  The next section briefly considers accounting from a 
Marxist perspective, drawing particularly on Marxs understanding of fictitious capital. 
 
A Marxist perspective on accounting for derivatives and fair value accounting 
As noted earlier, fair value accounting came under considerable criticism for its role in the financial 
crisis.  From a Marxist perspective the question of whether derivatives should be measured at fair 
value or historic cost would not make sense.  If a bank designs a purely speculative instrument, for 
example a naked credit default swap, the point is not whether or not it appears in the accounts at 
market value or cost, but that the instrument, and any profits which derive from it, are wholly 
fictitious and will never be paid out of the value creation process.   From a Marxist perspective, no 
value has been created.  A Marxist insight into the issue of derivatives is that any derivative whose 
value is purely speculative and not underpinned by the value creation process demeans money as a 
store of value.  If these types of financial instruments are permitted to flourish and a speculative 
bubble to develop, then a crisis will unfold. In essence a Marxist understanding of accounting for 
derivatives, financial instruments or other forms of fictitious capital turns on whether these 
investments are used to create real value and whether their profits or interest are paid as a share 
of that value.  So, for example, a Marxist analysis would argue that the interest on a bond which is 
paid out of surplus value is qualitatively different, from the profit on the sale of a credit default 
swap.  Money cannot create money on its own.  
 
A Marxist accounting solution to the problem of how to account for risk reducing instruments 
(forward foreign exchange contracts, credit default swaps and so on), would be to simply record the 
expenses connected with risk reduction derivatives as expenses.  From a Marxist perspective, this 
would make sense since it would highlight the proportion of surplus value which is taken by 
financiers58.  It would be possible for all derivatives to be accounted for in this way.  This would 
require a fundamental move away from the accounting rules which, for example, would classify a 
derivative contract which demands payment in more than a years time as a long term liability or 
pays future rewards, as an asset.    However, it does not get round the problem of how to account 
for any contractual future cash flows.  One practical (but not Marxist) solution to this would be to 
57
 The function of accounting in society is incredibly complex.  It legitimates (people rarely question numbers), provides a veil for 
companies to hide behind and makes neo-liberal ideas performative. 
58
 This accounting treatment would relieve some of the artificial volatility problems (see Butler, 2009).   
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put any monies due in the future as (non-discounted) liabilities while not recognising future cash 
inflows until they arrive. 
 
While the growth in derivatives may have been the catalyst for the expansion of fair value 
accounting, it is important to understand that fair value and fictitious capital are not direct 
equivalents.  Indeed it is entirely possible to place the value of a fictitious capital instrument in the 
accounts at historical cost.  In whichever way it is accounted for, any form of fictitious capital 
remains speculative. This means that the question of how investments should be accounted for is 
not a question of intent.  For example suppose Emeli, an ethical investment organisation, 
purchases a bond from a company whose sole purpose is to invest in real capital  for example, 
the machinery required to construct sustainable housing.  Emeli disapproves of financialisation and 
intends to hold the bond until maturity.  Under IAS 39, the bond would be classified as HTM and 
accounted for as an asset at cost price in Emelis balance sheet.  But, with all the best intentions in 
the world, the sustainable housing enterprise might fail.   This is an inherent property of fictitious 
capital.  And if Emeli is unaware the failure of the housing enterprise, then the losses on the bond 
will be hidden behind the (safe) historical cost value of the investment on the balance sheet.   
 
In this section it has been argued that accounting standard setting is increasingly international and 
funded by large private institutions.  These institutions represent weighty factional interests which 
will fight hard for the creation of standards which will best suit them.  Companies which do not like 
particular accounting standards can pursue many strategies.  Not least, they can threaten to 
withdraw funding from standard setting bodies, move to more friendly bodies and put pressure on 
governments to overrule standard setters (as in the case of IAS 139).  The accounting standards 
adopted since the crisis have been fragmentary interested interventions.  Accounting technologies 
have enabled, legitimised, hidden and animated the activities of financial institutions. The 
technologies of accounting which decide when and how contracts (bonds, CDOs and so on) should 
appear (or not) in accounts and the profits/losses which derive from them is crucial to legitimating, 
and enabling the reproduction of fictitious capital.  Accounting technologies make the fictitious 
real.  They have direct negative economic implications for the many, while enriching the few.  In 
the short term financial instruments can be used to create accounting profits so that the senior 
staff of financial institutions can earn huge bonuses59 and shareholders large dividends or 
speculative profits.  In the medium term investments which are not underpinned by any value 
creation will create financial havoc.  Yet those who managed to accumulate their massive bonuses, 
golden parachutes and pension funds will be unscathed by the fallout.  In 2007 when banks started 
to report losses, city traders in London took bonuses of £8.8 bn (Butler, 2009).    These traders will 
be the last to suffer from the current UK government austerity programme.   
Conclusion 
Although Marxist theory provides some interesting ideas about how to improve accounting 
standards, it is not the role of Marxist theory to solve the problems of capitalism, but rather to 
enable a deeper understanding of it.  The recent crisis was not solely a financial/speculative crisis 
caused by too much investment in derivatives.  Its roots were, in part at least, grown in the inability 
of people to pay their mortgages and to be able to command sufficient incomes to pay for the 
necessities of life (McNally, 2009).  The trajectory of neo-liberalism and financialisation, has led to 
the impoverishment of the lives of many people, devastated the life chances of a generation of 
young people and potentially left the baby-boomer generation with the prospect of a miserable old-
59
 In effect risky investments are made which are legitimated and frequently hidden or disguised through the interpretation of 
accounting standards.   
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age.  Marxist theory can be used to warn of the insanity continuing to speculate/gamble rather than 
to invest in real capital60 but it cannot overcome the contradictions of capitalism. 
 
One may well ask what lessons were learned from the crisis by those in power. In terms of academia, 
Gendron and Smith-Lacroix (this special issue) argue that very little has changed, especially among 
finance researchers.  In the realm of practice, Farrell and Quiggin (2012) chart how governments, 
central bankers and economists changed in the four years after Lehman's collapse from being 
"Keynesians in the fox hole" to merchants of austerity. In autumn 2008, the establishment was in 
crisis.  This presented a brief window of opportunity for Keynesians to garner international support 
for their economic-stimulus packages and reform of the financial sector.  As soon as the global 
economy appeared to have stabilised both governments and central bankers61 began to adopt 
austerity measures. Arguably, neo-liberalisms trajectory was slightly and temporarily diverted for a 
short period.  For the majority of those at the top of the finance sector nothing much has changed.  
The value of global hedge-fund assets rose by a record $122bn in the first quarter of 2013 to $2.4 
trn.  The private equity industry is larger.  It had total global assets under management of more than 
$3.2trn in 2012  the twelfth year of continuous growth since 2000 (Shaxson, 2013).   Tellingly, Marx, 
wrote that,   
 
Advantageously positioned as they are, the bankers and other gentlemen of high finance 
can set about exploiting the financial system as if it was their own private capital and 
thereby can appropriate a good deal of the real accumulation at the expense of industrial 
capital.  Marx, 1967, p 478 
 
In 2014 a significant amount of money is still flowing into the finance industry at the expense of 
investment in the real economy.  Hedge-funds and private equity firms siphon off massive 
commissions which might otherwise be used for more productive purposes.   
 
Accounting is an integral part of the symbolic universe of neo-liberalism.  Accountants and their 
technologies played a role in the crisis on many different levels.  It has been argued here that a 
financial economic view of the world meant that both accountants (who did not give going concern 
qualifications to banks which failed) and accounting academics were incapable of warning of the 
impending crisis.  Perhaps more importantly, their technologies animate and inform individual short-
term wealth maximizing strategies which have serve to enrich the few (at an alarmingly increasing 
rate) at the expense of the majority.  In the wake of the growth in extreme forms of derivatives, 
standard setters became mired in debates about how to account for derivatives and there has been 
much debate about fair value accounting.  In reality, in their drive for individualised wealth 
maximisation, different industries and institutions within the same industry, will battle to have the 
form of accounting standard that best suits their interests.  And those fighting hardest for their 
factional interests are the paymasters of the profession.  In terms of the contemporary debates in 
accounting surrounding whether or not we should have fair value accounting, mark to model 
accounting or something else which will give investors information about the future, the blunt fact is 
that such discussions totally miss the point that the value of claims to future cash flows are in 
Marxist terms fictitious62.  In an entirely strategic manoeuvre, the IASB and FASB embarked on 
another Conceptual Framework project after the crisis.  The outcome of this project to date has 
been that accounting practice has been refocused towards the needs of speculators in capital 
markets, away from the broader social and environmental concerns that may reflect the interests of 
60
 Ultimately, nothing can solve the contradictions of capitalism and as Harvey (2011, p 274/5) argues  a minimum of 3% compound 
growth forever, which is both empirically and conventionally accepted as necessary to the satisfactory functioning of capitalism, is 
becoming less and less sustainable. 
61
 led by Jean-Claude Trichet in the Eurozone 
62
 Interestingly, in 1938, former President Franklin Delano Roosevelt abolished mark to market accounting as it was believed that this 
valuation technique contributed to the severity of the Depression, thus causing financial institutions to fail (Cascini and DelFavero, 2011).    
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the community at large.  One of the eight parts of the project, the Framework 2010, embeds 
financialised markets at the centre of accounting practice (Zhang and Andrews, 2014).  As in the field 
of financial capital, nothing much has changed in the field of accounting. 
 
The one certainty in this discussion is that there will be another crisis.  An important question is -- 
how this will impact on the poorest in society and what can they do to protect themselves.  One of 
the rationalities of the system is that somehow risk can be traded away.  The way to accomplish 
this is to acquire a customised derivative to hedge risk.  How might this financial economic/zombie 
reality touch the poorest on the planet?  Without any form of support or state safety-net we are 
compulsorily becoming entrepreneurs of our own lives.   For the majority, their largest form of 
wealth is their own ability to work and to earn wages.  So currently individuals bear a risk (of falling 
income or unemployment) which cannot be traded because people are not commodities.  If a person 
were a commodity, she could securitise herself.  An individual could sell the exposure to the 
variability of her income for a guaranteed income stream.  Of course, the individual would be 
indentured to the owner of the security (effectively becoming a slave)63.   While this may seem far-
fetched, immoral and unthinkable, let us for one minute ask whether accountants would become 
involved in accounting for indentured people.  Given accountants historical record (for example in 
the holocaust, see Funnell, 1998), I for one, can imagine that some (zombie) accountants would rise 
to the intellectual challenge of accounting for securitised people so long as they can profit 
handsomely from their endeavours.   
 
 
 
  
63
 This example is drawn from The duality of labour and the financial crisis, Economic and Labour Relations Review, July 2010, p 49. 
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